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Abstract
Widely renowned typologies in Comparative Political Economy like the
’Varieties of Capitalism’ or the ’Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ are criti-
sized to neglect political conflict, because they selectively focus on institutional
characteristics, most notably labor relations and welfare regimes. In doing so,
they fall short to grasp the whole meaning of their categories. This analy-
sis moves beyond institutionally defined political-economic arrangements and
studies the role of public debates for different capitalist models. Using novel
relational data from an extensive content analysis of newspapers from 2004
to 2006, political conflicts on economic liberalization in Britain, France and
Germany are explored. More specifically, the structure of conflicts and the
influence of various political actors for the debate on economic liberalization
are precisely assessed. The results reveal persistent national peculiarities with
respect to political contention which can plausibly be ascribed to the influence
of long-term historical legacies and institutional complementaries as outlined
by capitalist typologies.
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1 Introduction
The literature on the various typologies of capitalist regimes is abundant. In the
last years, for example, research on the ’Varieties of Capitalism’ exponentially has
increased, but also Neocorporatist approaches and the ’Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism’ experience are commonly applied to explain national political-economic
peculiarities. However, common definitions of these capitalist regime types heav-
ily rely on institutional settings as defining characteristics. While a lot of research
has been done on institutional settings per se as well as the interaction of these
institutional settings with socio-economic outcomes like productivity or social pro-
tection, work on the relationship between the different institutional arrangements
and political conflict remains largely underdeveloped.
Research on how differences in capitalist regimes translate into debates is not
only rare, it is often also restricted to certain arenas of political competition, most
of all labor relations and party politics. Furthermore, political conflict mostly is not
consistently conceptualized as integral parts of a specific capitalist type but comes
as a theoretical byproduct of institutional arrangements. However, as the results
will show, differences in the conflict constellation between the countries under study
are striking and can plausibly be explained by the entrenched historical legacies as
assumed in the different typologies. This analysis thus provides a comprehensive
picture of national differences regarding public conflicts. More specifically, the con-
tent analysis data derived from mass print media allow to explore the structure of
public contestation including all actors that have a voice with respect to economic
policy making.
To avoid any misunderstanding, it is not the aim of this contribution to criticize
the concepts of capitalist regime typologies, since their institutional bias can well be
justified for most research questions in Comparative Political Economy. In contrast,
it is the aim to show that they have more explanatory power for political-economic
country differences. In comparing the three biggest Western European economies,
the UK, France, and Germany, this analysis therefore shows how the meaning of
these renowned typologies can be enriched by varieties of public debates.
After the presentation of the expectations on the debate analysis and the discus-
sion of the conceptual and methodical issues, the analysis will proceed in two major
steps. The first, more comprehensive part is concerned with the overall structure of
the debates in the three countries. The second part covers the distinct features in the
systems of interest intermediation, i.e. the relationships between public authorities,
trade unions, and employers.
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2 Economic pressures, institutions, and political conflict
2.1 The long-term transformation of economic policy making
Political and economic changes of the last decades brought about important chal-
lenges to Western European politics and profoundly shaped the preferences and
conflict constellations among political actors (Przeworsky and Yebra, 2005). A
greatly simplified way of describing these long-term changes is by distinguishing
globalization and post-industrialization processes. On the one hand, advancing eco-
nomic internationalization and intensifying political integration can be subsumed
as processes of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008; Held and McGrew, 2000; Dreher,
Gaston and Martens, 2008).1 Capital has not become completely footloose, but eco-
nomic activity has become significantly more dynamic on a global scale (Perraton
et al., 1997). And after the abandonment of the international Keynesian regime
of the ‘golden’ post-war era, advanced economies have integrated into a complex
multi-level governance system (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000: 1f.; Elkins, Guzman,
and Simmons, 2006).
On the other hand, terzialization, privatization, and welfare state transforma-
tion can be understood as processes of post-industrialization (Oesch, 2006; Ha¨user-
mann, 2010). As regards terzialization, technological change, altering consump-
tion patterns, and saturated markets increasingly impaired the opportunities for
traditional industries in Western Europe, while the service sectors grew (Iversen
and Cusack, 2000: 313f.). At a similar pace, the general direction of the rela-
tionship between the state and the economic sphere has shifted from public produc-
tion in lucrative businesses like telecommunications to regulation, and redistribution
(Vogel, 1996; Rhodes, 2001; Gilardi, 2005). And finally, labor markets were trans-
formed to incorporate more activating and market conforming employment policies
(Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Rueda, 2005).
There is a heightened debate among Political Economists on the causal rela-
tionships and relative weight of these different long-term trends (Kollmeyer, 2009;
Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Krugman, Cooper and Srinivasan, 1995), but as Polanyi
(1944) puts it, such national and international trends essentially are intertwined
and are thus mutually reinforcing each other in exerting transformative pressure on
national politics (see Bryan 2007).
1Since cultural and societal aspects of globalization like increasing immigration from far away
countries or increases in private correspondence potentially have little influence on debates regard-
ing economic policy making, these aspects will be left aside in the following discussion.
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2.2 The persistence of national peculiarities
Changes in the political-economic context induced similar transformative pressures
on all advanced economies, however, national systems are not on the way to a fully-
fletched convergence.2 Although the importance of national differences for policy
making relatively has declined since the 1970s, there still is a multitude of national
peculiarities (Schmitter and Grote, 1997; Huber and Stephens, 2001). Accordingly,
the co-existance of institutional complementaries which each are both economically
efficient and long-living is a main focus of neo-institutional typologies of capitalist
regimes (see Hay, 2004; Hall and Gingerich, 2009). Institutional complementaries
between countries are persisting because they are reinterpreted and reinvented by
contestation within the political elites (Hall, 1993). Politically relevant actors are
crucial ‘transmitting’ points for the diffusion of reforms intended to help economies
adapt to new challenges (Thatcher, 2006). As such, the peculiarities of political
conflict between countries therefore merit a more thorough study. Moreover, as
research on debates over European integration and abortion shows, especially public
debates are structured by entrenched historical legacies (Medrano, 2003; Ferree et al.,
2002).
2.3 Typologies of capitalist regimes and their institutional bias
Among the many conceptualizations of political-economic arrangements, a recent
and influential attempt is the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and
Soskice, 2001; Hancke´, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007). This approach identifies two di-
verging patterns of adaptation to economic changes. First, Liberal Market Economies
(LME) can be characterized by non-cooperative relations between unions and em-
ployers, a market-driven financial system, and arm’s length relations among firms.
Secondly, Coordinated Market Economies (CME), union-employer relationships are
comparatively cooperative, industries traditionally have close ties to banks, and
employers are organized in associations.
The parsimony of the VoC dichotomy, like almost all typologies of capitalist
regimes, comes with at least one major drawback. It is necessary to define a residual
category for countries that do not consistently fit into the expected pattern. In the
VoC literature, these are the Mixed-Market Economies (MME). Unfortunately, very
important countries like Japan or France belong to this category.3
2Such a convergence is presumed by the ‘hyperglobalist’ argument, which claims that most
countries are forced to adopt a single neo-liberal model until political differences do not pose
locational disadvantages any more (Ohmae, 1995).
3Very similarly, many scholars struggle with fitting Southern European countries into the
common welfare state typology (Leibfried and Bonoli, 2001).
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Schmidt (2009) convincingly argues that the misconception of the MME is due to
the neglect of the state as a central mediating and intervening actor in the economic
sphere. In dependence on Shonflied (1965), Schmidt thus extends the usual two
Varieties of Capitalism to three – Liberal, Coordinated and State-influenced (SME)
Market Economies.4 While in LME like Britain the influence of the state is limited to
rule setting and conflict settlement, it actively tries to facilitate economic activities
in CME and SME, although in different ways. In CME the state acts as a coequal
with employers and unions to negotiate employment protection and wages (Schmidt,
2009: 521). In an SME like France, by contrast, the state often appears as an
‘entrepreneurial state’ which actively decides over business activities (Thibergien,
2007). By separating the three new VoC by the relationship between the state and
the economic sphere, Schmidt (2009) is able to solidly classify the countries of the
vague MME category.
In its extended version, the VoC typology is partly able to incorporate two
other renowned classifications in comparative political economy. First, it matches
two of the three commonly distinguished welfare regime types (the ’Three Worlds
of Welfare Capitalism’, see Esping-Andersen, 1990). CME and SME actually are
complemented by conservative or social-democratic welfare states, while LME are
accompanied by liberal welfare regimes. In the UK, large social assistance of the
last resort, extensive activation measures, and conditioned access schemes to ben-
efits traditionally are important (Scruggs and Allan, 2008). In contrast, as long
as they are not scandinavian countries (the social-democratic welfare regime type),
the CMEs welfare systems historically rely more strongly on insurance-based un-
employment benefits and pensions. A further very important conceptualization of
institutional patterns is the neocorporatist distinction of different types of labor re-
lations (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979). There is congruence between corporatist
regimes and CME, whereas SME and LME are characterized by pluralist interest in-
termediation, leaving especially unions with a comparatively fragmented position in
labor relations (Sapir, 2006). For the sake of simplicity, the different types of capital-
ist regimes in the following are collapsed and labeled by their originally introduced
abbreviation (LME, SME, and CME). However, all just discussed characteristics are
meant with every notion.
There certainly is a large number of other influential classifications of advanced
economies like the distinction between Rhine capitalism and Anglo-Saxon economies
by Albert (1993). It is, however, neither the aim of this contribution to present a
4In Shonfield’s (1965) classical terminology on the ’Modern Capitalisms’, LME are equivalent
to the arm’s length capitalism, CME stand for an organized capitalism, and SME reflect the
interventionist capitalism.
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comprehensive overview of all typologies nor to review the vast literature which is
concerned with one or more typology.5 The aim is to address a common shortcom-
ing: the typologies inherently have a propensity to determinism in their focus on
institutions and, in turn, neglect the corresponding power structure in the classified
countries. More specifically, research on the numerous institutional regimes and
their impacts on social structure is vast, but research on the relationship between
institutional settings and political conflict is underdeveloped. The definition of cat-
egories almost exclusively focus on informal or formal institutions, e.g. types of
implemented policies in laws or patterns of conduct.
To be precise, some typologies take political contention somehow into account,
for example the distinction between conflictive and cooperative interactions between
employers and unions in neocorporatist definitions of labor relations. However, such
considerations only very selectively include political conflict. Furthermore, these
conflicts are rather understood as behavior patterns and therefore theoretically en-
dogenized a informal institutions. There is some research on how public opinion is
structured by capitalist regimes (e.g. Este´vez-Abe, 2005; Svallfors, 1997), but with
respect to political elites, if any research is done at all, almost exclusively parties
are in the spotlight (e.g. Huber and Stephens, 2001). It is an open question if the
systematic study of political conflicts adds substantively new insights to the litera-
ture on Comparative Political Economy, but the simple fact that conflicts are only
insufficiently considered by typologies of capitalist regimes justifies this contribution.
Other criticism of capitalist regime type definitions addresses their bias in favor
of specific arenas. Some authors call for a more systematic inclusion of foreign actors
as well as supra- and international bodies because international levels of policy
making have become more important (Crouch and Farrell, 2004). Others claim that
corporations and interest groups from the service sectors have to be subjected to
scrutiny (Blyth, 2003). Not only interest groups and state actors, but also supra- and
international bodies as well as corporations are therefore considered as increasingly
relevant actors (Hancke´ et al., 2007; Zu¨rn and Walter, 2005). Consequentially, the
analyses in the second part, which will be concerned with the crucial arena for
economic policy making, will include this so far neglected actors.
5There are, of course, detailed overviews, e.g. Hancke´, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007; Arts and
Gelissen, 2002.
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3 Conceptualizing the debate analysis
To use the words of Ferree et al. (2002: 4), this study is about the content of the
talk on economic policies rather than the policies themselves. In most simple terms,
this talk can be defined as a ‘public debate’ which is the sum of all public commu-
nications related to a particular issue (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wuest, 2010). This
definition owes a lot to established definitions on public discourse (Ferree et al., 2002;
Anderson, 1978).6 The reason to speak of a debate instead of discourse, however, is
the term debate underlines the confrontational character of public communication
(Helbling et al., 2010). Public communication may but does not have to be about
informed deliberation on an issue, it probably contains disputes, misunderstandings
and strategic behavior as well.
The content of this debate analysis is conceived as economic liberalization, i.e. all
contestation on the freeing of economic markets from the control by the state (Weiss,
2003). As an priori defined concept to guide the analyses, economic liberalization
includes a broad range of policies regarding privatization, competition and industrial
policy, employment regulation, social partnership, and trade and financial market
regulation. In Western European countries, different economic policies historically
have different importance within the regulatory regimes (Schwartz, 2001: 31). Yet
a comparative study that focuses on several policies at the same time better allows
to explore the scope and intensity of political conflicts on economic policies across
different national settings.
3.1 Dimensionality and actor classification
A debate is not an unstructured amalgam of communicative acts. A small number
of underlying dimensions usually is sufficient to describe the conflict ’space’ of a
debate, since ”while the detailed local substance of political competition varies in
idiosyncratic ways from setting to setting, key features of its structure are fairly
constant” (Laver and Sergenti, 2010: 17). The dimensions structuring this debate
were empirically established in a preparatory analysis, which is reported in Tables
A.1 and A.2 in the appendix. In short, the results indicate a two dimensional
debate with an international and domestic dimension. Similar divides between a
rather traditional left-right dimension and the dimension separating profiteers and
losers of internationalized markets was also found by other studies (see Zu¨rn and
Walter, 2005: 273f.; Kitschelt, 2007: 1183; Hall and Gingerich, 2009).
6While Ferree et al. (2002: 9) speak of a “public discourse about topics and actors related to
either some particular policy domain”, Anderson (1978: 23) defines public communication as the
“realm of discourse” in which “the deliberation of public policy” takes place.
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The actor categorization is a crucial step of the debate conceptualization, since
a simplification of the multitude of speakers making statements heavily precondi-
tions the interpretation of empirical findings. Most notably, the actor categorization
should be sensitive to the issue of the debate, since every policy domain entails its
own range of potentially relevant actors (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wuest, forth-
coming). This implies for this analysis that economic actors should be paid special
attention. Table 1 lists the actor types how they will be used in the analyses. The
classification starts with the very broad distinction between public authority actors,
intermediary actors and actors which are – strictly speaking – external to the po-
litical system. This is not to say that the ladder have no role in political opinion
formation and decision making processes, but their appearance in the political pro-
cesses is rather unconventional from a theoretical point of view, since they mainly
operate in the economic (companies) or societal spheres (experts and public interest
groups). The public authority actors include International Governmental Organiza-
tions like the WTO, European Union actors, foreign and domestic executive actors,
administrative agencies, judiciary actors as well as legislative bodies. Intermediary
actors, on the other hand, include all actors which aggregate societal problems and
demands, and translate them into more or less coherent political claims.
Table 1: Actor classification
Public Intern. Govern- General political IGOs (UN etc.); IGOs engaged in economic
authority mental Org. regulation (IMF, WTO etc.)
actors European Union General EU actors (Europ. Commission, Europ. Council of
Ministers, Europ. Council); Economic EU actors (Competi-
tion Comm., Europ. Council of Ministers for economic affairs)
Executive actors National, regional, and local executives; foreign executives of
EU members; OECD countries; transition/developing countr.
Administratives Administrative bodies for economic affairs (Economic regula-
tion agencies (e.g. antitrust or social security), central banks);
Other administrative bodies (infrastructure, security etc.)
Judiciary actors Courts and single judges
Legislatives Parliamentary chambers
Intermediary Interest groups Chambers of commerce; peak employer assoc.; assoc. for small
actors and medium-sized companies; trade unions; professional assoc.
Parties Communists/left socialists; greens; social democrats; conser-
vatives and Christian Democrats; radical/populist right; liberals
Actors Business Multinational corporations; Small and medium-sized business
external to Experts Economic experts (Economists; econ. forecasters; think tanks);
the political other experts (academic experts, journalists, artists)
system Public interest Charity, ecology, and animal rights organizations, Global justice
groups movement
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3.2 Selection of countries and time period
The country sample has to cover as much variance in the introduced typologies as
possible. On the one hand, each of the three selected countries (the UK, France,
and Germany) corresponds to one VoC type: the UK, besides the USA, is the
most cited example of an LME (Hall and Soskice, 2001); most authors point to
Germany as a typical CME; and France is an exemplary case of an SME (Schmidt,
2009). On the other hand, the sample also covers two of the three worlds of welfare
with Germany and France as two typical cases of a conservative welfare regime and
the UK as the archetype of a liberal welfare regime. This means that the social-
democratic welfare regime unfortunately is not included. This misrepresentation is
due to lacking linguistic skills of the researchers involved into the data collection,
which made it impossible to gather data from print media of scandinavian countries
representing the social-democratic case most adequately.7
It is the main aim of this analysis to get a comprehensive picture regarding the
national peculiarities in economic policy debates. This makes an investigation of the
debate structure in the early 2000s especially interesting, since both mainstream
actors pushing liberalization as well as rising challengers can simultaneously be
studied. The growing opposition is most obviously present with the ‘global justice
movement’, which is on the rise since the first protests at the WTO summit in
Seattle 1999, the radical left, which had a slight revival in the electoral arena (e.g.
‘die Linke’ in Germany), and some populist right-wing parties, which increasingly
started to adopt more protectionist policies, e.g. the Front National in France. The
reason for this heightened opposition lies in the fact that, in contrast to the rapid
liberalization steps in the 1990s, a stagnation in the liberalization processes can be
observed in the first years of the 21st century. This is due to the fact that debates
on further liberalization have turned to politically sensitive economic domains like
agriculture (e.g. within the framework of the WTO Doha Development Round,
actually stalled since 2001) and labor market regulations (e.g. in form of the fierce
conflicts on the ’Agenda 2010’ in Germany and the ’Contrat Premie`re Embauche’
in France). Due to the pragmatic need to keep the work load of the content analysis
manageable, the observation period does not cover all years of the 2000s, but only
the three years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
7The content analysis data set was established by the author and his collaborators in the
re-search project ”National Political Change in a Globalizing World“ (Kriesi et al., 2008).
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3.3 Varieties of debates?
This section deals with the expectations how institutions shape debates. The con-
straints and incentives shaping political conflict are not the same for all actors in
every country, since national political-economic arrangements shape political con-
flict by affecting how much influence different interests have in the policy making
processes (O’Reilly, 2005; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). More specifically, strategies
and success for political actors are dependent on institutions (Risse, Cowles, and
Caporaso 2001; Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt, 2004: 63f.).
Table 2 presents the main expectations in a condensed way. Corresponding
to the differentiation of the broader public debate from the systems of interest in-
termediation, the expectations on the debates are divided into two parts. On the
one hand, expectations on the debate structure in general are developed. On the
other hand, to assess varieties of capitalist debates in the decisive arenas, particular
attention is paid to the relationships within the systems of economic interest inter-
mediation as well as the role of the state in the economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001;
Schmidt, 2009).
Table 2: Expectations on the debate analysis
label description
distinctiveness The debate is characterized by a low distinctiveness in the UK,
moderate distinctiveness in Germany, and high distinctiveness in France.
overall climate The debate should overall be more liberal in the UK, protectionist and
interventionist in France, and ambivalent in Germany, i.e. overall centred
but highly conflictive.
actor positioning Left dilemma (labor unions) in the UK, right dilemma (corporations,
and employer organizations) in France, consistence in Germany
actor saliencies Going public of challengers for mobilization vs. going public of powerful
actors to gain bargaining power (resource argument).
To begin with the more intuitive expectations, institutional settings shape the degree
of distinctiveness of public conflicts, i.e. how national debates still run in the dif-
ferent countries. To a large extend, the territorial scope of economic policy making
has extended in two ways beyond the national state (Held et al., 1999: 80f.; Hooghe
and Marks, 2001). First, vertical mechanisms of transnationalization are responsi-
ble that supra- and international actors and multinational corporations increasingly
enter the debate (Howarth, 2006: 85f.; Lehmkuhl, 2006: 149; Schneider and Grote,
2006: 12). Secondly, horizontal transnationalization as the increasing influence of
national actors in a country’s debate is a further substantive process (Koopmans
9
and Erbe, 2004; Trouille, 2007). These trends, however, are not expected to uni-
formly affect all countries in the same ways. In France, the most influential actors
are expected to keep the debate as national as possible, since the strong national
government (in collaboration with employer associations and business) should be
reluctant to give away control over the economy. In Germany, national networks
between social partners and administrations should be an important barrier to a
transnationalization. Since there is, however, also a clear trend to ’europeanize’
labor relations (Lehmkuhl, 2006), the distinctiveness of the debate should neverthe-
less be relatively moderate. In the UK, finally, labor relations and the influence of
national public authorities are kept at a comparatively low level, which should lead
to an open debate, i.e. a low distinctiveness.
Further, the overall climate of the debates should also be influenced by insti-
tutional arrangements. Intuitively, the debate should overall be more supportive
of economic liberalization in the UK. The UK as the liberal case in this study has
a long-standing tradition as promoter of free markets due to its legacy as former
hegemon and main profiteer of the world trade system (Gifford, 2007). On the
basis of the historical legacy in France, in contrast, the debate is expected to be
relatively interventionist and protectionist, i.e. against economic liberalization on
both dimensions. In France modernization strategies traditionally relied on major
industrial projects with far-reaching state intervention (Maclean, 2002). In Ger-
many, finally, public conflicts should be relatively balanced between opposing and
supporting forces of economic liberalization. As will be discussed below in more
detail, neither trade unions nor employers are stuck in a policy dilemma, making
them able to consistently enter the debates. This should lead to a balanced yet
conflictive debate.
Two sets of expectations with regards the systems of intermediation are es-
tablished. The first is concerned with the positions and internal consistence of
actors. Western European unions (except in Scandinavia) have to cope with de-
clining membership numbers, since they still have difficulties to incorporate welfare
state outsiders (Ha¨usermann, 2010; Rueda, 2005; Regini, 2003). Therefore, they
have a hard time to maintain social protection at a fairly high level and are facing
continuous pressure in negotiations on employment security to make concessions in
the light of high unemployment numbers and increasing welfare costs (Baccaro and
Simoni, 2008). The crucial argument here, again, is that unions experience with dif-
ferent strengths of pressure depending on the overall climate in the debates. Thus,
unions in the UK should be especially forced to make concessions for more flexi-
ble market regulations, which is expected to lead to major divides between single
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unions. In the France and Germany, unions are expected to have lesser problems
to keep a consistent stance in the debate. Here unions are expected to avoid a left
dilemma.
In France, employer associations and business are expected to experience a right
dilemma. The overall protectionist and interventionist climate confronts business ac-
tors with the incentive that they could opt for oligopolistic strategies keeping profits
within the national economy because public authorities clearer signal their willing-
ness to shelter them (Roach, 2005: 19). This, however, contradicts the common
assumption that business principally pushes for liberalization. In Germany, finally,
neither business actors and unions are expected to face an intractable situation. On
the contrary, both sides may try to be as consistent as possible to strengthen their
position for the next round of labor market negociations.
The final set of expectations concerns the relationship between the institutional
structure and the saliencies of actors. It may be rather complex, since political-
economic arrangements may enhance the visibility of already powerful actors in a
debate (the resource argument), or they give rise to challengers because they are
otherwise excluded from the decision making arenas (the mobilization argument)
(Kriesi, 2003). More specifically, the resource argument leads to the expectation
that institutionally privileged actors manage to prevail in the debates, since they
dispose of large resources in public relations (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 24). By employing
public-related strategies, powerful actors may attempt to impose their specific point
of view also in the public debate (Kernell, 2006). A contrasting argument can be
made regarding potential challengers in the debate. As long as they face no policy
dilemma, challengers can be expected to extensively engage in public campaigns
exactly because they are institutionally disadvantaged in the policy-making arenas.
For such challengers, ’going public’ is a survival strategy to influence decision-making
by mobilizing public support for their arguments (Gamson and Meyer, 1996).
If the most powerful actors in terms of access to a debate are considered, public
authority actors can be expected to loom high in every country, but especially high
in France. Most political actors are only selectively given the access to the centers
of power in France, which arguably makes it hard for anyone except the strong
state to develop a substantive standing in public debates (Kriesi et al., 1995). The
unions, however, are expected to be the radical challengers in France which could
try to influence decision-making on economic policies from outside the negotiation
process. Their very high readiness for strikes or demonstrations gives a cue for
the mobilization argument regarding the unions in France. Since business actors
face a dilemma between the sheltering and liberalization of markets, corporations
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and employer associations are accordingly expected to be less prominent in France
relative to the other countries.
In Germany the resource argument points to a strong presence of both public
authority actors and social partners, since these actors traditionally are responsible
for the most important economic policy decisions. In the light of this importance of
interest intermediation arena, corporations cannot easily influence economic policy
making as directly as in other countries. However, they of course can try to use
their know-how in public relations to bypass labor market negociations.
Research on the EU level has shown that relatively weak networks among interest
groups give corporations a competitive edge over employer associations and unions
regarding the access to decision-making arenas (Eising, 2007). According to the
resource argument, corporations should therefore have a higher salience in the UK
than in Germany and France. Further, in comparison to the role public authorities
have in other countries, the position of the government is weaker. Its role in labor
relations is mainly reduced to that of a merely ’neutral’ regulator and so it could
try to enhance its influence via a mobilization strategy. Unions, in contrast, drop
out as potential challengers because they suffer from a programmatic dilemma.
4 Data and analysis strategies
4.1 Sampling and coding of newspaper articles
The basic methodological choice to explore political conflict by means of a content
analysis of mass media reports requires some justification, since there are various
strategies to analyze political conflicts. First, it is nearly impossible to find existing
comparative data sets which encompass all relevant actors. Party manifesto data
and most expert surveys, for example, are restricted to parties and ignore unions and
business actors (see Keman 2007). A further advantage in relying on print media
data is that it captures the competition among, and confrontation between, actors
better than other data does (Helbling and Tresch, 2009).
For each country, one quality newspaper was included into the content analyses
(’The Times’ in the UK, ’Le Monde’ in France, and ’Die Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung’ in
Germany). This decision is pragmatically motivated, since the heavy work load of
the content analyses compelled to restrict the data collection to only one newspaper
per country. The external validity and internal reliability of the data, however, were
assessed and are satisfying (see below). Quality newspapers were chosen since they
are particularly suitable for the study of debates. They remain the leading medium
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of political coverage, and in this role, they report the debates in the most detailed
manner (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2008).
The identifying of actors and their issue and actor-specific positions was done
sentence by sentence, using the Core Sentence Analysis (CSA). This approach is
specifically designed to analyze political conflict (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2007; Kriesi
et al., 2008; Axelrod, 1976). Each sentence of an article is reduced to its most basic
structure (a ‘core sentence’) that contains only the subject (the actor), the object
(an issue) and the direction of the relationship between the two.8 The relationship
between subject and object is always quantified using a five point scale ranging from
-1 to +1.9 In the following example, two of these actor-issue relationships can be
established from a section of a article published in the Times on May 31, 2005 (see
Table 3 ).
Table 3: CSA coding example
Original Text:
’Mr. Blair has made economic reform the top priority of his presidency, hoping
to make labour markets more flexible [...]. However, he is now likely to face
challenges from President Chirac, who recently called economic ultra-liberalism
the ”new communism of our age”.’
(The Times, May 31 2005, Battle for the heart of Europe).
Core Sentences:
subject direction object
Blair +1 labor market reform
Chirac –1 economic liberalization
If the CSA data are collected from several hundred newspaper articles, a debate can
be mapped by constructing average positions and saliencies. Since fully computer-
based techniques to automatically recognize such complex relational data are still
in their infancy, the coding had to be done manually (see Wuest et al., 2010). This,
however, has the severe drawback that the data collection requires an enormous effort
of time and costs. To keep the workload tolerable, sophisticated sampling strategies
and a custom designed software framework for the large-scale data collection were
applied.10 The sampling was done in two steps. First, the relevant events of the
8The number of core sentences in an article, however, does not equal the number of grammatical
sentences, as one sentence can include none, one or several core sentences.
9-1 means opposition and 1 means support, with three intermediary positions indicating a
vague or an ambiguous relation.
10The coding software basically is a web-application which is equipped with an administra-
tive panel to organize large-scale data collections and allow simultaneous annotation for several
coders. For further information and a tryout of the software framework see http://www.bruno-
wueest.ch/Software.html. All parts of the framework are open source and, as long as third-party
software is not concerned, free to use for scientific purposes.
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debates were identified using various yearbooks11 as well as the annual reviews of
the newspapers in our sample. These lists formed the basis for an extensive keyword
list for each country, helping us to find potentially relevant articles. The advantage
of creating such event lists is that many false negative selections are avoided because
the lists are in advance adapted to the country-specific characteristics of the debate.
Subsequently, a chronological sampling of 1,200 articles per country was drawn.12
Finally, given the still time-consuming coding procedure, the amount of core sentence
collected from a single article additionally was limited to twenty.
A second major flaw of manual content analyses is the difficulty to assess the
quality of the gathered data. On the one hand, however, the external validity
of the CSA approach has been established. Comparisons of CSA data generated
with data from expert judgments, party manifesto coding, and mass surveys show
that all indicators for actor positions are highly correlated (Helbling and Tresch,
2010). On the other hand, coder disagreement is also potentially hampering the
data quality. In a pretest, six coders obtained a coefficient of reliability of 0.77
for coder agreement on the identification of core sentences. Inter-coder agreement
for the correct coding of actors and issues was 0.88 and 0.85, respectively. Given
that the typical level of acceptance for intercoder reliability is 0.80, coder agreement
was within acceptable limits already before the coding (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch
and Bracken, 2002). Additional coder training, refined coding instructions and a
continuous monitoring of the coders during the coding process were provided to
address remaining uncertainties for the actual data gathering.
4.2 Analysis strategies
Three aspects of the data analysis deserve more specific explanation, since they
do not belong to the standard approaches political scientists use. The first is the
core sentence related measures for position and saliencies. The basic step of all the
analyses is to calculate the position of actors as well as two salience measures. The
position of an actor simply is calculated by taking the average of the directions from
all the coded core sentences that contain a relationship between this actor and an
issue, dimension or the whole debate. Positions therefore range between -1 and 1.
Further, actor saliencies, defined as the relative frequency with which statements of
an actor are reported compared to all other statements, are calculated.
To assess conflict intensity, a measure based on Taylor and Hermann’s (1971)
11Keesing’s World Record of Events, Facts on File World News Digest Yearbook etc.
12In contrast to time-invariant selection procedures, a chronological sampling captures the dy-
namics of a debate by tracking the frequency distribution of relevant articles.
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index of polarization in a party system is used. The index considers how strong
actors vary in terms of their positions on an issue or dimension by simultaneously
accounting for the actor’s salience (for a detailed definition, see Table A.3 in the
appendix). And finally, to identify coalitions of actors in the political spaces that
share similar stances on economic liberalization, a modified kmeans clustering is
applied. Ordinary kmeans clustering requires the definition of a starting configu-
ration, but the actors used in this analysis are too heterogeneous to suggest one.13
To circumvent this decision, the kmeans++ algorithm as proposed by Arthur and
Vassilvitskii (2007) is applied which empirically calculates stable starting configu-
rations.14 Additionally, in contrast to ordinary kmeans clustering, the number of
clusters are inductively determined since they are a crucial part of the empirical
findings. Previous to the clustering, different solutions are therefore compared by
their silhouette width (see Rousseeuw, 1987).15
5 Varieties of conflict constellations
5.1 Transnationality of contestation on economic policies
The beginning of the analysis is concerned with the question to what degree the
debates in the three countries under studies are still mainly structured by national
politics. If debates predominately run equally in the different countries and if they
are dominated by international actors, then an assessment of a ’varieties of debates’ is
seems at least contraintutive. There are different ways to assess the transnationality
or distinctiveness of political conflict in different countries (Koopmans et al., 2005).
One could spotlight the addressee of claims, i.e. the regulative level at which the
claim for a new policy is directed. However, statements on policy positions as
reported by journalists with a limited time and amount of space in the newspaper,
are rarely specific enough to get solid information about addressees. Two more
intuitive and practicable ways to compare debates are to contrast issue usage and
13If no starting configuration is given, kmeans randomly draws cluster centers. This, however,
returns unstable and often sub-optimal results, both statistically and substantively. For example,
it is difficult to say to which coalition the social democratic parties belong: to the supporting or
opposing coalition with respect to economic liberalization? Social democrats traditionally were
interventionist parties but have adopted ever more economically liberal positions, especially when
seizing government.
14Kmeans++ calculates optimal cluster centers by minimizing the average squared distances
for all data points to the centers before the actual clustering calculation is started.
15The silhouette width is the average of the degree of confidence in the clustering assignment of
every actor. More precisely, the degree of confidence of every clustering assignment is calculated
by comparing the average distance between the actor and all other actors in the same cluster and
the average distance between the same actor and all other actors in the ‘nearest neighbor’ cluster,
i.e. the cluster next to the own cluster (see Table A.3 in the appendix for a definition).
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actor salience across countries. On the one hand, one can focus on the congruence
of the issue usage, i.e. if the debate is centered on the same issues at the same time
in the different countries. On the other hand, the focus can be on the origin of
the actors that shape the debates. Accordingly, Table 4 presents the congruence of
the issue usage over the three year time period under study, while Table 5 lists the
share of statements for the different levels of policy making. The two analyses lead
to contrasting insights. In general, this points to the fact that content-driven and
actor-driven transnationalization are completely different aspects of distinctiveness.
The correlation coefficients in Table 4 show the relationship between the issue
salience in the single countries relative to the country weighted overall issue salience.
As for all analyses here, it is not clear if the actual values in absolute terms indicate
high or low levels, since there is no solid reference framework. Therefore, all conclu-
sions will only relatively be drawn.
Table 4: Distinctiveness I: Congruence of issue usage among countries
Pearson’s R n1
UK 0.74 53
France 0.83 43
Germany 0.77 42
Notes: Country weights applied for overall calculations. 1 n=average number of actors per year.
The pattern in Table 4 contrasts the distinctiveness expectation which suggested
France as having the most distinct debate: The issue usage in the French debate is
closest to the overall mean; the debate in the UK runs very distinct; and Germany
takes the middle ground. This analysis, however, only reveals, what the debates are
about and not who prevails in the debate. This distinction makes a big difference, as
can be seen in Table 5 where the expectations regarding the distinctiveness are fully
met. Overall, 62.7 percent of all statements were made by national actors and 8.5
percent by actors from other countries, which mostly are foreign governments but to
a small degree also foreign companies. Vertical transnationalization is manifest in
the considerable share of 10.5 percent for actors from the European level (this cate-
gory captures all EU actors) and 18.3 percent for international actors which consists
of actors from International organizations as well as multinational companies.
The UK is the most open country, especially for international actors. And
compared to France, also foreign actors more forcefully enter the debate. Despite
the fact that a comparison with a solid benchmark is impossible, it is striking that
just above half of all statements are made by national actors in the UK. On the
other end, 71.8 percent of the debate in France are occupied by national actors,
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which should give them an edge to influence the debate. The differences among
the three countries are mostly due to different saliencies of foreign and international
actors. European actors, interestingly, have a more or less similar share of statements
in every country, revealing a homogenizing role of the EU in the debates.
Table 5: Distinctiveness II: share of statements by actor origin in percentages
origin overall UK France Germany
national 62.7 55.9 71.8 60.3
foreign 8.5 10.5 6.5 8.2
European 10.5 11.9 9.1 10.6
international 18.3 21.8 12.6 20.9
n 4880 1416 1849 1631
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes: Country weights applied for overall calculations.
The relationship between the capitalist regime type and the distinctiveness therefore
has to be reformulated. In France, national actors play a more important role in
shaping the debates, while in the UK, access for foreign, European, and international
actors is less difficult. The liberal context in the UK, opens the debate for non-
national actors. However, this has no repercussion on how congruent the debate
runs in terms of its content, which is most distinct in the UK and closest to the
cross-national level in France.
5.2 The overall climate in the UK, France, and Germany
The first analyses have established that there is variation in the distinctiveness of the
debates regarding what is debated and who participates. This section is concerned
with a first general assessment of how the debate runs in the three countries. For this
purpose, Figure 1 presents the average positions of the countries with respect to the
two main conflict dimensions. These average positions give a preliminary impression
of the overall climate in the debates. France, as expected, is not only protectionist,
i.e. anti international liberalization, but also interventionist, i.e. against domestic
liberalization. As we will see throughout the analysis, this hostile climate regarding
both aspects of economic liberalization is due to the solid opposition of the majority
of actors in France. The UK is most liberal only regarding international liberaliza-
tion. With respect to domestic liberalization, however, the UK’s overall position is
not different from zero. In Germany, the overall climate of the debate is only partly
as expected, too. On this level of analysis, the debate is solidly liberal on both
dimensions instead of balanced around the mean.
The indices for conflict intensity in Table 6 show that the liberal positions in Ger-
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Figure 1: Overall debate climate: average positions and confidence intervals per
country
many are heavily contested. Conflict intensity is highest in Germany and also rela-
tively high in France, but substantively lower in the UK. The liberal character of the
debate in the UK, thus, is not only reflected by its very liberal position regarding
international liberalization, but also in the low intensity of contention, since actor
positions in the UK have not the same variety as in Germany and France.
Table 6: Conflict intensity in the debates: polarization on economic liberalization
by country, level of actors
Overall UK France Germany
0.16 0.06 0.20 0.23
Notes: Country weights applied for overall calculations.
5.3 Country-specific policy coalitions on economic policies
The most important insights from the previous section were that, on a highly ag-
gregate level, the debate is distinctively protectionist and interventionist in France
and comparatively comparatively very low conflictive in the UK. This section is
concerned with possible explanations of these findings. In most general terms, the
observed country differences can be explained by different sets of coalitions shaped
by actors with similar policy positions. Accordingly, Figure 2 shows the basic indi-
cators for all actors which reached more than ten statements in the debates. While
the center of a circle indicates the mean position of an actor on the two dimensions,
the size of the circles indicates the relative frequency of the statements made from
the respective actor (i.e. actor salience). Further, the dotted circles indicate the
coalitions inductively derived from the cluster analysis as described in Table A.4 in
the appendix.
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The most important single actor type is the national executive. Furthermore,
the salience of the national executive is higher in France than in the UK and Ger-
many. This points to the dominant position of the national government for policy
decisions. Even more interestingly is the position of the national government in
France. As expected and quite in contrast to the executives in the other countries,
the French government is distinctively against international liberalization. This re-
sult is even more striking since, during the debate period, France was governed by a
conservative executive. The Labour government in the UK, instead, had a substan-
tively more liberal position in the debate. In Germany, governmental responsibility
changed from a social democratic executive under Schro¨der to the ’grand coalition’
CDU/CSU and the SPD under Angela Merkel. But also here, executive actors
generally embrace the liberalization of the economy.
A second big player in the public debates are the unions. They loom highest
in France but are also strong in Germany. Although they are hostile against both
aspects of economic liberalization in every country, their overall position in the UK is
comparatively liberal, pointing to ambivalent positions among different unions. The
EU, IGO, and foreign executives, on the contrary, mostly are distinct liberalizers.
Except the executives from transitional and developing countries in Germany, they
push the debate into a more liberal direction. This effect is strongest for the UK,
were they are relatively more important than in the other two countries. The non-
national actors further are joined by conservative and Christian democratic parties
in their embracement for more open markets, both domestically and internationally.
Business actors and their interest intermediaries are also strongly present in the
debates, although with varying salience and consistency. Regarding salience, Ger-
many has a comparatively strong involvement of economic interest groups. Here,
almost all types of economic interest groups are present. Regarding consistency,
business actors and employer associations are solidly economically liberal in their
positioning in Germany and the UK. This sharply contrasts France, where small
businesses and professional organizations are ambivalent or against a further liberal-
ization of the economies. These results may point to the right dilemma expectation,
but they certainly are too preliminary to really be substantive.
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Figure 2: Conflict constellations: actor positions on the two dimensions, actor
salience, and coalitions per country
Notes: Only actors with more than 10 statements included into the analyses.
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A more comprehensive picture regarding the varieties of capitalist debates are
revealed by the cluster analysis.16 Table 7 shows the average positions and sizes of
all coalitions found in the three countries.
Table 7: Size and position of coalitions per country
average position size in %
UK France Germany UK France Germany
coalition dom. int. dom. int. dom. int.
supporters 0.10/ 0.15/ 0.25 0.83 0.41 0.50 52.9/ 23.4 66.2
0.11 0.76 47.1
opponents – -0.70 -0.69 -0.30 -0.29 – 35.2 33.8
protectionists – 0.18 -0.24 – – 41.5 –
n 1377 1784 1578 100 100 100
Notes: Country weights applied for overall calculations. Int.=international liberalization;
dom.=domestic liberalization.
The constellation of the two coalitions in the UK reveal why this LME has both a low
conflict intensity and a substantively liberal debate. Both coalitions, on average, are
supporting economic liberalization and approximately are of equal size (52.9 and 47.1
percent). The first coalition, which is dominated by the national executive, however,
is much less supportive of international liberalization than the second coalition which
is dominated by multinational corporations but has still a positive stance (0.76 and
0.15, respectively). In sum, there actually is no significant opposition, which sets
the UK sharply apart from the two continental countries.
In France, there is not only a fiercely oppositional coalition of a considerable size
(35.2 percent), but also a protectionist coalition which is responsible for 41.5 percent
of all statements. While the ladder is lead by the national executive, experts and
small businesses, the former is mainly shaped by unions and social democrats. The
truly economically liberal coalition has shrunk to meager 23.4 percent. The debate in
France is, as expected, more interventionist, also because the oppositional coalition
more radical than any other coalition in the three countries (-0.70 on domestic and
-0.69 on international liberalization). Moreover, there is a clear majority in favor
of protectionist measures in France if the biggest and second biggest coalition team
up.
With respect to the overall debate climate, Germany has a rather liberal but
highly conflictive debate. The reasons for this finding are visible in the cluster re-
16Although the coalitions are inductively generated, they nicely match Sabatier’s (1993)
widespread definition of advocacy coalitions, since they are calculated using policy positions and
issue saliencies.
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sults. In contrast to the UK, there is a consistent oppositional coalition in Germany
which is responsible for the high conflictive climate. The unions, however, are the
only notable actor in this coalition, which means that the coalition relatively has
little weight in the debates. Only about a third of all statements come from this
coalition, which contrasts the prevalence of protectionist forces in France. In com-
parison with the UK with its two not very distinct coalitions and France with its
three coalitions, the situation in Germany thus is a clear-cut antagonism between a
economically liberal mainstream and left challengers.
6 Varieties of labor relations
In the last section the conflict structure among all forces which appear in the debates
have been the subjects of analysis. For the second part of the analysis, the system
of interest intermediation as the central arena of economic policy making is in the
focus. More specifically, the analyses are concerned with the salience of actors in
the debates as well as the internal consistency in terms of support or opposition.
6.1 Who dominates interest intermediation in the three countries?
Table 7 indicates the importance of different actors in terms of the relative fre-
quency of their statements in the debates. While the overall results give reason to
support of the resource argument, but the results by country rather give edge to
the mobilization argument. Overall, the executives and administrations with their
institutionalized channels to mass media coverage and corporations with their public
relation resources come first and second with 28.2 and 27.7 percent. Strikingly, cor-
porations intervene almost three times as much than employer association in public
debates and their salience almost equals the sum of statements made by employer
associations and unions together. While unions also have a substantial salience,
employer associations and intra- and supranational actors fall behind.
If the saliencies are compared across countries, however, it is peculiarly inter-
esting that the actors which can be regarded as institutionally disadvantaged by
a specific context have a relatively higher salience than in countries where their
access should be facilitated. In the UK, governmental actors and the administra-
tion are responsible for more than one third of all statements. This contrasts the
resource argument, which, in the light of the lean state approach in LME, would
have expected less salient executives in the UK than in France and Germany. Addi-
tionally, the comparatively low salience of state actors in France and Germany are
also rather contradicting the resource argument, since these actors beside the debate
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should take a more central in decision-making processes on economic policies. In a
similar vein, unions and corporations loom highest in the countries where they can
be expected to have a weak standing in decision-making processes. In Germany,
corporations mainly are integrated into dense corporatist networks and therefore
subject to more constraints regarding their direct influence on policy making. Their
relatively high salience in the debates thus rather reflect a challenging going public
strategy aimed to mobilize support for the own positions. And the unions in France,
usually excluded from the decision making processes, have a considerable strength
in the debates.
Table 8: Salience of actors in the systems of interest intermediation: relative fre-
quencies of statements by country, in percentages
Overall UK France Germany
intra-/supranational actors 13.3 14.4 11.3 14.7
executive/administration 28.2 36.4 28.1 20.5
corporations 27.7 27.8 23.4 32.5
employer associations 10.3 9.3 6.7 15.3
trade unions 20.5 12.1 30.5 16.9
n 3385 1115 1205 1052
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes: Country weights applied for overall calculations.
All this gives support to the argument that, regarding industrial relations, institu-
tionally disadvantaged actors can gain a high visibility in public debates which could
– but by no means must – give them more leverage for influencing decision-making
processes. However, the mobilization argument cannot explain all differences be-
tween countries, as the low salience of the unions in the UK and corporations in
France shows. The next section will show that exactly these actors face a policy
dilemma which prevents them to forcefully enter the debates.
6.2 How conflict within business and interest groups is structured
So far, the actors as categorized were treated as homogenous contestants, but they
obviously can internally be divided. These actors are aggregated categories which
can be cover conflicts within the organizations of a specific actor type. Figure 3
shows the share of oppositional forces in the actor categories of the system of in-
terest intermediation. To begin with, the share of oppositional corporations and
employer associations is higher in France than in the other countries, pointing to
considerable conflict within these actors. More specifically, over 40 percent of corpo-
rations in France and over 30 percent of employer associations are opposing economic
liberalization. In a similar vein, unions in the UK are deeply divided. Even slightly
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more than 50 percent of unions actually are embracing further liberalization steps
in the debate.
Figure 3: Strength of opponents by country and actor category: Share of organiza-
tions with a negative average position in percentage
As regards the other actors, a quite high consistency can be observed – except for
the corporations in the UK, were roughly a third of these organizations are op-
posing liberalization. The supra- and international actors as well as the executives
and administrations in all countries are firmly supportive of economic liberalization.
Additionally, corporations in Germany and employer associations in the UK and
Germany are similarly embracing the further opening of markets. Unions in France
and Germany, on the other hand, are completely interventionist and protectionist.
If the most important organizations for these actor groups are considered, we
get a more intuitive sense of the policy dilemma the corporations (in France and the
UK), the unions (in the UK), and the employers (in France) face. In each the UK
and France, two of the most salient corporations are actually opponents of a fur-
ther opening of markets. Perhaps not surprisingly, three of these four corporations
are state-owned companies (Royal Mail, Ele´ctricite´ de France, and Gaz de France).
The fourth company, the Chinese carmaker Nanjing Automobile, was involved in
a bidding battle over MG Rover during the time period of the data collection and
probably was eager to calm public concerns. The most salient supporters of eco-
nomic liberalization, on the other side, in all countries are private multinational
corporations, e.g. Nestle´ and Renault in France, Siemens and Hewlett-Packard in
Germany, and British Airways in the UK.
As regards the most important employer associations in France, ’Coordination
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rurale’, an important professional organization for farmers, is among the most im-
portant organizations and an opponent of economic liberalization. The opposition to
economic liberalization of farmers is not surprising and a fact in all three countries,
but that the farmer association has such a high salience in France is nevertheless no-
ticeable. In the other two countries, the most influential organizations consistently
are big industry and moneyed interest groups.
With respect to the unions, all big unions are opponents of economic liberal-
ization in Germany and France. In the UK, however, only the pubic sector union
(PCS) is opposing economic liberalization. The big private sector unions, Amicus
and T&G,17 are actually supporting economic liberalization. This illustrates the
left dilemma of the unions in the UK which was already visible in the rather liberal
overall position of the unions and the high share of supportive organizations in the
debate. Unions in the UK, thus, seem to be under more intense pressure than their
counterparts in the other three countries.
6.3 A test for alternative explanations
So far, it was assumed that national peculiarities are ’naturally’ relevant for the
systems of interest intermediation. Competing explanations for deviating actor po-
sitions, however, could be far more influential and actually diminish country effects
if they are controlled for. Regarding the system of interest intermediation, such
explanations include sectoral distinctions (Midford, 1993; Frieden, 1991), the differ-
entiation into professional and employer associations (Schneider and Grote, 2006), or
the separation between big and small business (Kitschelt, 2007). Table 11 presents
a test of alternative explanations and country effects on the support or opposition of
unions, employer associations, and corporations on the level of single statements.18
First, two sectoral distinctions are introduced into the models, that is the differ-
entiation between manufacturing and service sectors as well as between the public
and private sector. Second, actor specific characteristics are added, including a
professional organization/employer association dummy and the distinction whether
an interest organization is concerned with a special interest or if it is an umbrella
organization representing very broad interests. For corporations, finally, size is an
additional indicator which is included by the separation between big and small and
medium-sized business.
17In 2007, they merged into Unite
18Since most directions are either completely negative or positive and there are only a few
intermediary values, the position was standardized to a dichotomous variable.
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Table 9: The influence of country and sector affiliations on support of economic
liberalization by social partners: logit regressions on the level of statements: un-
standardized coefficients (log odds), standard errors and levels of significance
unions employer assoc. corporations
Std. Std. Std.
Coef. Err. P>z Coef. Err. P>z Coef. Err. P>z
countries (ref = Germany)
UK 0.930 0.519 + -0.185 0.366 n.s. -0.380 0.176 *
France -0.296 0.613 n.s. -1.184 0.517 * -0.789 0.175 ***
sectoral distinctions
service sector -1.228 0.801 n.s. -1.524 0.493 ** -0.183 0.153 n.s.
(ref = industries)
public/mixed sector 0.165 0.845 n.s. 0.461 0.517 n.s. -0.43 0.285 n.s.
(ref = private sector)
actor specific distinctions
special interest org. -0.294 0.548 n.s. 0.102 0.702 n.s. – – –
(ref = umbrella org.)
professional org. – – – -1.137 0.420 ** – – –
(ref = employer assoc.)
big business – – – – – – 0.073 0.152 n.s.
(ref = small and medium-sized bus.)
Intercept -1.061 0.523 * 1.946 0.520 *** 1.099 0.185 ***
n 220 230 925
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.13 0.02
Notes: Country sample weights applied for all models. Levels of significance: ***=<0.001,
**=<0.01, *=<0.05; +=<0.1. Coefficients show the logarithmic form of the ratio between the
probability that a positive statement on economic liberalization occurs and the probability that
there is a negative statement on economic liberalization. A positive coefficient thus always means
that the independent variable is influencing the dependent towards a more favorable position in
terms of economic liberalization in general.
Regarding unions, they almost do not differ in their positioning regarding the sug-
gested variables. Only the difference between the unions in the UK and Germany
is very slightly significant. The positioning of employer associations, in contrast,
differs significantly across various variables. French employer associations are com-
paratively less inclined to opt for economic liberalization than German employer
association. Further, employer associations from the service sectors are less sup-
portive of economic liberalization in comparison to manufacturing industries. In a
similar vein, professional organizations are far more sceptic against economic liber-
alization than employer associations.
In sum, only employer associations substantively deviate regarding the suggested
alternative variables. Most notably corporations, but also employer associations,
however, differ in their position across the three countries. Although rather a su-
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perficially, this test thus gives some support that country differences still are rele-
vant despite the far-reaching economic and political integration processes of the last
decades.
7 Conclusion
This analysis tried to enrich common typologies of capitalist regimes by the as-
pect, how political conflict in different institutional settings is structured. Further,
not specific arenas have been studied, but all actors which have a voice regarding
economic liberalization were included into the analysis. Overall, the results clearly
indicate a variety and not a congruence of debates. Despite convergence pressures
in the last decades, political conflict remains different from country to country, de-
pendent on long-term path dependencies. Furthermore, the relationship between
institutional settings and debates may be more complex than intuitively expected:
while the overall climate matches the capitalist regime type quite nicely, the impor-
tance of actors in the debate contrary to their institutional opportunities.
In France, the State-led Economy under study, national actors, most notably
national public authorities, prevail in the debates. This ’exclusion’ of non-national
participants comes with an substantive interventionist and protectionist climate of
contestation, which, in turn, forces business and employer associations into a policy
dilemma between support of protectionist measures and the internationalization
of economies. France accordingly is the only country where protectionist stances
find a majority among the policy coalitions. Excluded from the central arenas
of decision-making, unions further heavily try to mobilize support over the public
debate. Quite in contrast, the open climate in the UK facilitates the access for non-
national actors to the economic debate. Moreover, the debate in this Liberal Market
Economy also merits the label liberal since no oppositional coalition challenges the
mainstream. The unions, as only noteworthy opponents, are deeply divided between
private and public sector unions. And further, executive actors loom much higher
in the debate than in France and Germany, although they can institutionally be
regarded as disadvantaged in the UK. Germany in many respects takes a middle
ground between the two other countries. In contrast to the UK, the situation in
Germany is characterized by a clear-cut antagonism between a economically liberal
mainstream and left challengers. But contrary to France, the economically liberal
forces are in the majority. And corporations are the most prominent actors in
Germany.
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A Appendix
Dimensionality of the debates
For the identification of the number and character of the dimensions, the actor statements
were first aggregated to six issues reflecting at least two competing analytical concepts
(see Table A.1 ). Subsequently, a factor analysis was applied on these six issues to find
the optimal dimensionality of the debate. First, the issues were grouped according to
the distinction between international and domestic liberalization . Besides this distinc-
tion, freeing as the introduction of more competition into markets and deregulation as
the reduction or elimination of governmental regulations were discerned (Polanyi, 1944:
140; Vogel, 1996: 3). While the deregulation issues are not further disaggregated, freeing
issues need a further differentiation since they still contain very diverse aspects of eco-
nomic policy making. Regarding the domestic freeing issues, labor market policies are
separated (freeing domestic labor markets) from general market policy domains (priva-
tization). Concerning international freeing issues, locational promotion policies, which
cover conflicts on the introduction of more international competition by making national
economies more attractive, from internationalization policies, which contain conflicts on
the further deepening of the global economy, are separated.
Table A.1: The issues of the debate on economic liberalization
concepts issue description
domestic/ privatization Support for privatization and national
freeing market liberalization in general.
domestic/ freeing domestic Support for more flexible labor market regu-
freeing labor markets lations (e.g. working time or retirement age).
international/ locational Support for the advancement of education, infra-
freeing promotion structure; opposition to bailouts, sheltering of
national industries or tighter competition policies.
international/ internation- Support for the Single European Market, the
freeing alization internationalization of markets, liberal tax regimes,
free movement of labor and foreign investment
domestic/ social Support of social compensation plans social
deregulation protection partnership, or stricter corporate governance.
international/ international Support for more regulation regarding
deregulation regulation trade, financial markets, taxes, and labor rights.
Notes: All labels are formulated in a way that the dimensions and issues have a clear direction in
favor of economic liberalization. This is important for the consistency of the analyses, since the
meaning of positive and negative with regards to policy statements is always clear.
The results of the factor analysis in Table A.2 show that only two factors reach an eigen-
value above 1. And the factors seem to reflect the distinction between international and
domestic liberalization. The loadings of privatization, locational promotion, labor mar-
ket deregulation, and anti social protection are clearly higher for the first factor, whereas
internationalization and anti international regulation clearly load higher on the second
factor. Locational promotion was expected to be located on the international dimension.
The results lead to the conclusion that locational promotion is a domestic issue which is
more explicitly centered on creating a good environment for economic activity within a
country, e.g. the establishment and maintenance of infrastructure or supportive regulation
for business, rather than enhancing national competitivity vis-a`-vis other economies. For
the analyses, locational promotion is therefore collapsed with the three issues privatiza-
tion, labor market deregulation and anti social protection to the domestic dimension.
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Table A.2: Structure of the debate space for all six countries: result of exploratory
factor analysis with all 6 issue categories on the level of actor categories
categories factor 1 factor 2
privatization -0.67 -0.19
labor market deregulation 0.90 0.13
anti social protection 0.58 0.07
locational promotion -0.58 0.04
internationalization -0.20 -0.85
anti international regulation 0.01 0.86
Eigenvalue 1.97 1.53
Proportion 33% 26%
n 26
Notes: Principal-component factor analysis based on actor-issue positions weighted by their
salience, varimax rotated solution. Only actors with more than 10 statements included into the
calculation.
Table A.3: Index definitions: Polarization and silhouette width
index definition
Polarization P =
k∑
k=1
ωk(χk − χ¯)2;
where ωk is the salience of actor k, χk is the position of actor k on the issue,
and χ¯ is the weighted average position on this scale, where weights are again
provided by the actor-specific salience.
Silhouette S =
k∑
k=1
δ¯k−η¯k
max(δk,ηk)
;
width where δ¯k is the average distance between actor k and all other actors in the
same cluster, and η¯k is the average distance between actor k and all other
actors in the ‘nearest neighbor’ cluster, i.e. the next cluster to the own cluster
of actor k. max(δk, ηk), accordingly, are the maximal distance from k to another
actor in the same and in the nearest cluster.
Table A.4: Fit of cluster analyses for the coordinates on the two dimensions and
centers of optimal cluster solution per country
silhouette width kmeans++ cluster centers
2 cluster 3 cluster 4 cluster 1. center 2. center 3. center
int. dom. int. dom. int. dom.
UK 0.406 0.403 0.351 0.05 0.24 0.82 0.00 –
France 0.455 0.459 0.429 0.82 0.20 -0.35 0.26 -0.79 -0.63
Germany 0.478 0.459 0.417 0.52 0.44 -0.51 -0.23 –
Notes: Country weights applied for overall calculations. Int.=international liberalization;
dom.=domestic liberalization.
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